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LOSS of international competitiveness, high rise in interest rates, an acceleration of infl ation and reduction of the national income growth rate characterize the U.S. economy since the late 1960’s. These factors, which 
refl ected the corrosion of the post-war political-institutional order, gave rise to an 
intense process of fi nancial innovations followed by the dismantling of quantitative 
controls (Glass-Steagal Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) that, 
until then, had constituted one of the principal characteristics of the US fi nancial 
system. (Belluzzo & Coutinho, 1996; Braga & Cintra, 2004). 
It is from this period that the process of American “institutionalization of 
savings” began - i.e., the increase in the importance of institutional investors as 
wealth managers and of credit in relation to deposit institutions – and securities 
market and derivatives growth. To these trends, which increased the level of 
competition, major American banks reacted by introducing other fi nancial 
innovations (deposit certifi cates, repurchase agreements, etc.) in such ways as to 
circumvent the limits of interest rates to which they were subject (Cintra, 2000). 
The competition between banking and non-banking institutions and the 
introduction of fi nancial innovations such as instruments of funding, investment, 
and risk management transformed the banking business.2 On the one hand, 
the large commercial banks were leaders in aggregating different institutions 
that, under distinct legal boundaries, went on to offer services for underwriting  
deposit certifi cates and stocks, insurance and wealth management  through 
investment funds and pension funds.3  On the other hand, credit for households 
became strategic issues for banks. The falloff in profi tability in operations 
with large and medium size companies was compensated in part by higher 
profi t margins from those operations (Freitas, 1997; Cintra & Cagnin, 2007a; 
Goodhart & Hofmann, 2007; Bhatia, 2007).
For American households, the new fi nancial structure translated into an 
increase in fi nancial wealth directed to funds (mutual funds, pension funds and 
money market funds) originating from a movement toward “institutionalizing” 
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savings. Moreover, the introduction of fi nancial innovations and strategies of 
banks aimed at households allowed for the expansion of credit offerings. Financial 
assets valuation came, thereby, to have two effects. On one side, expansion of 
consumption was stimulated to the detriment of developing savings4 to the 
extent that households saw themselves as wealthier (the wealth effect). On the 
other side, it increased the capacity for indebtedness, once the household’s asset 
enhancement had improved their evaluation for risk by creditors. The creation of 
new fi nancial instruments allowed economic agents to transform the valuation of 
their wealth into purchase power without making it necessary to sell assets. 
U.S. companies’ assets structure also changed in the sense of involving 
greater participation in fi nancial assets, on the one side, and on the other, the 
liability of market instruments. Financial assets participation went from 25.8% of 
total U.S. company assets in 1970 to % 49.3%, in 2005, while the bulk of bonuses 
for liability instruments went from 46% in 1970 to 57%, in 2005, and bank loans 
fell from 29% to 12% in the same period.
With this shift, institutional investors assumed greater importance in 
defi ning the condition of company fi nances. Favorable evaluation among these 
agents, expressed in stock prices and conditioned by the returns generated by 
corporate administrators, defi ned winning business strategies. In this manner, 
a company’s decisions about assets investment, sale or purchase began taking 
into account the impact on stock capitalization, based on the evaluation of 
its shareholders. To the extent that their expectations came to be frustrated 
in relation to the share return from a given company, institutional investors, 
representing the shareholders, sought to reduce their holdings in these assets. 
The devaluation of shares that resulted from this behavior reduced the value of 
the company, stimulating merger operations or hostile takeovers with resulting 
decimation of its directorate. This structure of American corporate governance 
is thus known as value-based shareholder system of corporate governance (Aglietta, 
2008; Braga & Cintra, 2004).
In the face of the need to increase income, companies expanded their 
investments in the sense of incorporating fi nancial assets. As Braga (1997) 
pointed out, the accumulation of fi nancial assets on corporate balance sheets 
became a permanent way to defi ne the way private wealth management is 
conducted in a deregulated, liberalized and sophisticated fi nancial environment. 
This derives from the greater complexity of decisions for valuing company 
capital that also runs through productive investments, developing beyond 
the level of income and jobs, through investment in fi nancial assets, with the 
less certain effect on economic growth of the aim of capital earnings. These 
decisions also involved the choice of the amount of leverage and the ways to 
fi nance asset operations. In this way, the search for greater profi tability in the 
short run through price oscillations of shares traded on the organized markets, 
typical of institutional investors, wound up also infl uencing the management of 
large corporations. 
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This article is structured in four sections in addition to this short 
introduction. Following an analysis of the U.S. economy in the 1990s, the fi rst 
section seeks to articulate the established conventions of fi nancial markets for 
expenditure decisions of agents in a fi nance-led economic dynamic. The second 
section deals with the fi nancialization of real estate, i.e. the transformation 
of fi nancial instruments in the construction and acquisition of real estate that 
allowed the valuation of American housing wealth to assume the role performed 
by stocks in stimulating consumption and aggregated investment. The interaction 
between the housing cycle and the economic cycle in the U.S. recovery of 2002 
will be treated in the third section. The fourth and fi nal section emphasizes 
the complexity of debt and credit as it was infl uenced by the introduction of 
fi nancial innovations and by the quest for increased profi t by fi nancial agents. 
These elements functioned as a hot wire that transformed the crisis in the 
subprime mortgages segment into a much deeper fi nancial crisis, reaching security 
operations, the derivatives and stock markets. 
The Finance-Led Economic Cycle of the 1990s
The expansion of participation in fi nancial assets in household and 
corporate portfolios came to exert an important infl uence on the management 
decisions of these agents. The characteristics of fi nance-led economic growth are 
defi ned by the interrelations established between the price cycle of fi nancial assets 
and economic dynamism.5
The period between 1992 and 2000 comprised the expansion phase of a 
fi nance-led economic cycle in the United States. In spite of not having presented 
growth rates as robust as in previous periods, this expansionist phase was the 
longest of the U.S. economy.6 
Technological innovations introduced throughout the 1990s created 
synergy between different sectors – such as telecommunications, computer 
hardware, software, the internet and entertainment – opening new business 
opportunities whose results were diffi cult to be grasped a priori. This process 
was accompanied by an expansion of investment and productivity. Gross private 
investment grew from 11.6% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 1991 to 17.7% 
in 2000, and investment in equipment and software went from 4.9% of GDP to 
9.4% of GDP in this same period. Companies considered it necessary to leverage 
investments in order to quickly create and occupy a new market so that it could 
impose its technological standard on later companies. This is a fundamental trait 
in technology sectors, guaranteeing extraordinary earnings to the company in 
possession of the dominant standard (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005).
The opening of new business frontiers and the escalation of profi t, 
impelled by productivity earnings, raised the ceiling for stock markets. Diffi culties 
in defi ning reliable projections from still non-existent business returns, as well 
as in evaluating the impact of new technologies over more traditional sectors, 
resulted in the proliferation and intensifi cation of speculative behavior in these 
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markets. The evolution of infl ation allowed the Federal Reserve to keep the 
fed funds rate stable throughout the second half of the 1990s. The anchoring 
of infl ationary expectations prevented conjunctural, short-term movement in 
the form of high interest rates from dousing the prevailing optimism in Stock 
Markets. Low interest rates and optimism over valuation of stock wealth provided 
incentive for credit expansion, feeding asset market speculation still further7 
(Aglietta, 2008; Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005). 
In a short while, the optimism of the stock markets spread throughout 
the many sectors of the fi nancial market. Interest rates in general fell and offers 
of credit increased. An overlapping of the processes of housing wealth valuation 
and credit expansion generated mechanisms that allowed consumption and 
investment to expand at average rates (3.5% and 6.8%, respectively) above GDP 
growth (3.3%) between 1991 and 2000. In their ascent the stocks of fi nancial 
assets became increasingly represented in corporate and household portfolios; in 
this way, these agents could more easily have access to credit sources, using the 
appreciated assets as guarantees. 
Elasticity in credit offerings allowed economic agents (holders of fi nancial 
assets) to obtain purchase power without thereby being obliged to disrupt assets. 
This purchase power was directed as much toward consumption and investment 
as to fi nancial markets, reinforcing the tendency to valorization of fi nancial assets
The other side of this process was the fragilization of private agents’ 
balance sheets. Household debt level as a percentage of GDP jumped from 63.3% 
in 1991 to 72% in 2000 while non-fi nancial corporate debt went from 41.4% to 
46.8% of the GDP during the same period. The correlation between household 
debt and disposable household income grew from 87.9% in 1991 to 112.2%, 
while the service of this debt, which represented 17.36% of disposable household 
income in the fi rst quarter of 1991, reached 18.24% in the last quarter of 2000.
The public sector, in turn, showed a tendency toward reduction of its 
need for fi nancing beginning in 1992. In 1998, it was able to obtain a surplus of 
US$ 37.9 billion that was expanded to US$ 159 billion in 2000. This result was 
obtained as much by restraint of expenditures, including social, as from the rise in 
the tax burden.
Despite this tendency, optimism for the fl ourishing of the “new economy,” 
began to weaken in the fi rst half of 2000. Portfolio share managers reevaluated 
the relevance of accepting new businesses typical of the digital era, but which 
weren’t able to show expected profi tability. Throughout the decade, some of the 
new businesses, whether in technology or from the internet (dotcom) which went 
public, taking advantage of the speculative behavior of fi nancial agents, never 
managed to become profi table; others never knew how they were going to do it. 
Moreover, in some sectors, especially those tied to new technologies, the verifi ed 
downtime capacity was high, signaling a lower performance than expected. In 
March, 2000, the bull market turned around. Between March and December of 
that year, the NASDAQ Index fell almost 50%. 
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The process of reevaluating portfolios was generalized among fi nancial 
markets. Leveraging operations, in place in previous years, and which to a great 
extent had taken shareholder stock as collateral, needed to be dismantled. In 
the quest for liquidity it was necessary to confront the requirements of assumed 
obligations which caused liquidation of positions and the fall of prices in 
different markets. 
The impact of devaluation of assets over GDP was already sensed in the 
fi rst quarter of 2000 when the real rate of growth registered a value of only 1%, 
pulled by the retraction of 6.9% in private investments. Even omitting the second 
quarter, when the low basis of comparison from the next two quarters began 
with an expansion of 6.4%, the performance of the other two fi nal quarters of 
the year was also discouraging.  In combination with reduced consumption new 
contractions in private investments brought this about. 
This downward tendency seemed to have exhausted itself when, after 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, stock quotations began to once more rise. 
The predominant perception was that the American economy was no longer 
in recession and was strongly recovering. However, successive falls in stock 
market quotations brought to light innumerable problems that had gone 
unperceived in the euphoria of corporate profi ts during the long cycle of valuing 
productive and fi nancial assets in the 1990s. With the fall in the excitement 
level there appeared schemes to stimulate new and accentuated declines in the 
prices of shares that were susceptible to deep macroeconomic repercussions, 
which included threatening the incipient growth recovery and provoking a new 
recessive process. 
It would not have been the fi rst time in history that revelations of schemes 
enacted in times of euphoria would prompt a reversal of investors’ feelings to 
lead to a crash (Kindleberger, 1992b)8. What was unusual, however, was for this 
to occur after a long period of falling prices and, therefore, a correction of the 
excesses committed during the “bubble”9 formation. Such a peculiarity deepened 
and intensifi ed the falling stock prices. A crisis of confi dence in American 
stocks by investors had an impact on world stock markets, creating moments of 
extreme tension. According to data released by the International Federation of 
Stock Markets, losses in the world markets surpassed US$ 11.5 trillion, being 
more than US$ 5.4 trillion in the United States alone (http://www.fi bv.com) 
between March 2000 and June 2002. This crisis of confi dence originated in the 
convergence of various scandals and malfunctions in the United States capital 
markets such as the evaluations of companies for classifi cation of credit risk, 
recommendations of fi nancial analysts, accounting problems in company reports, 
and the role played by auditing and consulting companies.
In sum, the causes of deceleration and recession of the U.S. economy 
were associated with the reversal of the expanding circuit including the valuation 
of fi nancial assets, credit, consumption and investment that is characteristic 
of fi nance-led cycles. Thus, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the 
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scandals involving aggressive accounting practices in 2002 contributed to a 
deepening of the defl ationary and recessionary tendencies in asset prices in the 
U.S. economy. 
As in the expansive phase of the cycle, the contracting phase was also 
marked by its own characteristics. The 2001 recession revealed itself as one of the 
briefest and smoothest the U.S. economy had yet confronted, although there was 
no great fi nancial crisis that put the solidity of the system at risk. Many of these 
characteristics were related to the agility of response by the monetary authority 
and the Treasury, and with an accentuation of the tendency for appreciation of 
American housing wealth.
The reduction of the basic federal funds rate by the Federal Reserve 
throughout 2001, a decline of 70%, made it possible to maintain the level of 
public debt throughout the fi scal expansion. Declining taxes and the expansion 
of fi scal expenditures ensured the preservation of consumer spending, essential 
for the recovery dynamic. Consumption still addressed the increase of household 
liability by the ballast of the valuation of its real estate assets. Housing therefore 
was a replacement for the role of stock asset wealth in the established circuit of 
assets, debt and consumption. While household debt maintained its ascending 
path, corporations began a process of rapid reduction of their liabilities (Cintra & 
Cagnin, 2007b).
Housing Financialization
Transformations in the fi nancial structure and practices in the United 
States narrowed the relations between the housing market and the fi nancial 
market, setting in motion a process of “housing fi nancialization,” starting 
primarily in the 1980s. This process allowed, on the one hand, diversifi cation of 
fi nancial contracts and the expansion of credit stocks through the use of property 
as collateral and on the other hand, deepening the dependency of price and 
production cycles in relation to the ups and downs of fi nancial markets (IMF 
2006, 2007). According to Dubach (2008), this fi nancing process occurred 
by means of two mechanisms: the expansion of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REIT) and the use of housing mortgages securitization. 
REIT are investment funds for subdividing real estate property, as well as 
for construction and management. This fi nancing mechanism made real estate 
investments more liquid and imposed profi tability demands on them in accord 
with the established benchmarks of the fi nancial markets. In spite of having been 
created in the 1960s, these funds only began expanding in the 1980s. In the 
1990s, the REIT market received an important push to the extent that pension 
funds were authorized to invest in real estate by means of this instrument. On 
that occasion, there also occurred an internationalizing movement of REIT funds 
toward Europe and Japan. As Dubach (2008) says, the entry of these funds in 
Japan played an important role in the development of the Japanese real estate 
bubble at the beginning of that decade. 
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While REIT fi nancing has been shown to be more important in the case 
of commercial properties (in 2005, 51% of REIT in the United States referred 
to offi ce and commercial buildings), the securitization of housing mortgages 
performed a central role in the case of residential housing. 
Housing mortgage securitization, i.e., transformation of credit portfolios 
into negotiable securities, has its roots in the housing fi nance reform headed 
by the U.S. government at the end of the 1960s. The combination of the 
acceleration of infl ation and the existence of tax rate interest limits on loans 
and term deposits (Regulation Q) created problems for resource fund raising 
by the saving & loan institutions (S&Ls) that were responsible for fi nancing 
housing purchases. The introduction of fi nancial innovations by major banks and 
institutional investors which were not subject to quantity controls reduced even 
further the ability of S&L to attract deposits, making it diffi cult to refi nance their 
asset positions, which to a great extent were comprised of long term mortgages. 
New challenges were added to the problems of liquidity in the 1960s and 
1970s from the shock of interest rates set by Paul Volcker in 1979 and with the 
elimination of the limits for interest rates through the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Because of a time mismatch 
between their assets and liabilities, the rise of interest rates following their 
liberalization resulted in higher costs for the S&Ls to raise resources, at the same 
time that their assets profi ts continued to be defi ned by previously established, 
fi xed interest rate, long-term mortgage contracts.
Since the S&Ls were the principal type of mortgage grantor institution, 
the crisis in these institutions necessarily meant a crisis in housing fi nancing 
arrangements. The importance of the housing sector in terms of economic 
growth and creation of jobs as much as social policy created the political 
conditions that sustained a succession of institutional transformations led by 
the State. 
The American government then went on to encourage mortgage backed 
securities or MBS operations, anchoring the system in four institutions, besides 
the mortgage banks and saving & loan institutions (S&L): Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).
The entire system was built on the basis of either direct or indirect public 
guarantees. For this reason, these agencies were able to raise funds in the markets 
at interest rates much closer to the ten-year rate of the American Treasury 
(T-bonds). It became the consensus in the fi nancial markets that these agencies 
would receive help from the Treasury in the event of asset instability, whether of 
a public character of the FHA and Ginnie Mae, or from the importance played 
by the two other agencies that, in truth, are private companies with shares 
traded on the Stock Market.10 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to a great extent are 
responsible for the sine qua non condition of the American housing fi nancing 
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system, i.e., the ability to make liquid the mortgage operations characterized by 
long term contracts. 
It was through the guaranty mechanisms that these institutions 
deepened the MBS market. In these transactions, housing loans were packaged 
and passed on to a combination of investors (investment funds, pension funds, 
etc.) that bought securities, whose guaranty as collateral was the property 
itself (and the housing credit payments) and which could be negotiated on 
the secondary market for this type of security.11 Since the 1930s the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) had provided guaranties for loans at major 
risk of default, thus benefi ting the lowest income portions of the population. 
The credits guaranteed by the FHA (and also by the Veterans Affairs – VA) 
were purchased and then securitized, primarily by Ginnie Mae, but also by 
Fannie Mae. The latter received permission starting in 1968 to buy conventional 
mortgages; in other words, mortgages not guaranteed by the FHA/VA. 
Starting in the 1980s, Fannie Mae became the major guarantor of mortgages 
in the United States. Freddie Mac was created to securitize conventional 
mortgages from its origin in 1970.12
With the expansion of mortgage credit and the major liquidity of the 
secondary MBS market, major private commercial banks also constituted 
themselves as important actors in mortgage securitization. Given the high 
participation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, these banks attempted to increase 
their operations in this market by occupying segments not addressed by them. 
Since then, mortgages whose contracts did not fi t within the requirements 
of the GSE could be securitized. This factor was incentive for verifi ed 
diversifi cation of family credit contracts in recent years. The maintenance of low 
interest levels starting in 2001 prompted fi nancial agents to look for alternative 
income sources that would effectively mesh with non-traditional mortgage 
securitization.
Thus an important process of fi nancial innovation took hold, as much in 
mortgage contracts as for those underwriting them. Among the new expansion of 
housing mortgage contracts after 2002, the following could be cited: 
• Interest-Only Mortgage (IO) by means of which the taker need pay only 
the interest on the value of the loan for a predetermined time. The IO 
contract is not a new contract, but is in conjunction with an option 
within traditional fi xed-rate mortgages (FRM) or adjusted-rate mortgage 
(ARM) mortgages. Thus, with each monthly payment the borrowers 
has the right to decide to pay only the interest or the interest added to 
the amortization of the principal. This is a type of contract sought by 
those borrowers who wish to spend the lowest amount possible during 
the fi rst months of the debt (because of this, generally, it is tied to an 
ARM), or from hoping for an increase in future personal income, or 
when there is the expectation of refi nancing the mortgage at the end of 
the amortization period.
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• Negative Amortization Mortgage (Neg-Am) which is also known 
as “pay-option ARM”.13 This contract is an IO mortgage with an 
additional option joined with an ARM contract. The borrower of this 
type of loan has each month the right to choose between three options: 
to pay only the interest or the interest added to the amortization, or to 
make a “minimum” payment, established by contract, whose value is 
less than the interest payment. If the minimum payment is chosen, it 
would be as if the borrower were making a negative amortization. The 
difference between the minimum and the interest total of that period 
is incorporated into the principal of the loan. As with IO mortgages 
the options in Neg-Am contracts also have a time limit for applicability, 
after which payments should include the sum with reference to 
both interest and amortization. This type of contract guarantees 
reduced payments at the beginning, but can grow signifi cantly after 
the conclusion of the option’s validity. Depending on the contract’s 
stipulations, monthly payments can be raised more than 40%. 
• Hybrid-ARM, like many, is intended to reduce payments during the 
fi rst years of the mortgage. In this contract, during the initial period 
generally from two to fi ve years, the recipient pays fi xed interest rates, 
consisting of an FRM. After this phase, interest rates become fl exible, 
in general adjusted semi-annually in agreement with LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offer Rate), i.e. it goes on to consist of an ARM. It is worth 
remembering that from inception monthly payments include the 
portions pertaining to amortization. 
• Hybrid IO-ARM, as in the case of the hybrid-ARM mortgage, this 
contract combines fi xed and fl exible rates, but allows the recipient to 
make payments for a predetermined period of time on only the sum of 
the interest,.
Another practice that gained popularity was that of a second mortgage, 
known as a piggyback, issued simultaneously with the principal mortgage. This 
contract can exempt the taker from a down payment at the mortgage signing. 
Traditional contracts generally require a down payment of 20%; in other words, 
the mortgage covers only 80% of the value of the property. In case a greater 
relation loan-to-value (LTV) is desired, the recipient should, in the majority of 
cases, secure it with a private institution. The great incentive for taking out a 
second mortgage on the value of the property which is not covered by the fi rst 
mortgage is taxation. Interest payment expenses for mortgages are tax deductible, 
while the insurance expenses are not. 
One common way to piggyback is by means of a Home Equity Loan 
(HEL), which consists of a line of credit for a specifi c purpose (generally for 
improvements to the property or to complete its purchase), using for collateral the 
value of the property still unused to guarantee the second mortgage.
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The maximum loan limit is determined on the basis of an analysis of the 
credit of the recipient and the existence of mortgages on the property to be taken 
as collateral. There is generally a fi xed rate interest on HELs. Another way to 
acquire a piggyback is by taking out Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOC), which 
is a type of pre-approved credit that turns a property into a guarantee, similar in 
a way to the HEL. However, HELOC does not require a specifi c purpose to be 
defi ned for the use of loan resources, which also can be used to complete a fi rst 
mortgage as well as for consumption in general. Home Equity Loans and Home 
Equity Lines of Credit consist of two types of Home Equity Lending.
Secondary market contracts also became more sophisticated with the 
issuing of multiple-class MBS, also known as Collateralized Mortgage Obligation 
(CMO). Starting from a conjunction of MBS based on mortgages with different 
maturity and risk levels, various classes of securities (tranches) were issued, which 
are rated according to the priority of receipt of payment date and absorption 
of losses resulting from defaults from mortgages used as collateral. Generally 
there are three classes of securities: senior, mezzanine and equity. Interest-plus-
principal payments cascade, in other words, the fi rst goes to the senior class, then 
the mezzanine and, fi nally, the equity class. In the event of losses, however, the 
impact on the securities is in the reverse order; the senior class would be the last to 
have its payment committed. 
After 2002, the intersection of fi nancial innovations in mortgage contracts 
and insurance processes made possible expansion of the American house fi nancing 
system toward operations associated with higher risks. Thus, the segments 
denominated as subprime – which bring together recipients without a credit 
history or even with a history of default – and Alt-A (Alternative A) – which 
consist of loans to borrowers without proof of income, but with a good history 
of payment – showed strong growth. According to Zelman et al. (2007), the 
contracting of subprime mortgages jumped from US$ 213 billion in 2002 to 
US$ 640 billion in 2006.
The operations in this segment are neither eligible for the FHA’s public 
guarantee nor to be secured by GSE since they are not within these institutions’ 
parameters. Private agents, however, could be responsible for transforming these 
credit portfolios into securities, using complex insurance tools known as special 
purpose vehicles14 (SIV). Major American banks performed an important role in 
building the credit pyramid that addressed insuring mortgages already insured 
by collateralized debt obligation (CDO)15 I issued by SIV and guaranteed by 
banks through lines of credit or repurchase agreements (Eichengreen, 2008; 
Guttmann, 2008).
Thus, management of the housing fi nance crisis in the 1980s gave rise 
to an integrated system in securities market whose dynamic allowed strong 
expansion of housing mortgage credit, with a favorable unfolding for economic 
growth in the United States starting in 2002, but which was accompanied by 
fi nancial innovations and a growing accumulation of risk (Cagnin, 2007).
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Housing Market Appreciation and the U.S. Economic Recovery 
of 2002
The Federal Reserve’s low interest rate policy that began in 2001 in order 
to reduce the cost of the debt stimulated, on the one side, demand for housing 
credit, expanding the system in toward lower income households, and on the 
other, was conducive to reducing risk aversion in the fi nancial markets, through 
expansion of credit offerings and easing the insurance of mortgages, including 
those with non-traditional contracts. Expansion of the totally private circuit 
of the system, i.e., from segments of the system without public guarantees 
(implicit or explicit), created the conditions for the increase in use of these non-
traditional contracts.
To the extent that the availability of fi nancing expanded, the demand for 
housing also heated up. Once that housing supply became relatively inelastic, 
in the short term the result was a strong rise in prices. It is quite true that, 
differently from fi nancial assets, whose markets are centralized and organized, the 
intensity of property appreciation varied in different regions of the United States. 
Qualitative differences between the properties, such as location and its physical 
characteristics, and the debt capacity of the buyers, generated heterogeneity in the 
rhythm of real estate appreciation between regions. The recent rise in prices was 
most concentrated in metropolitan regions and in some states such as Florida and 
California.16 The relationship between these regionalized housing markets and 
monetary policy was mediated by the fi nancing system. Even if it had not been 
generalized to the same magnitude between regions, appreciation of housing 
wealth, from concentration in densely populated areas, presented impacts that 
could be noticed in the American economy as a whole. (Goodhart & Hofmann, 
2007; Greenspan, 2005; Angell, 2004). 
The rise in housing prices had an impact on the household assets in a 
manner similar to the appreciation of stocks throughout the 1990s. However, 
indications pointed to a greater intensity of this impact in terms of housing. It 
is estimated that, in 2003, approximately 68% of the American population were 
housing owners, while 52% had stocks. Moreover, housing property was more 
diffused both geographically and among different income classes17 (Nothaft, 
2004). Empirical works by Case & Quigley (2001) and Bayoumi & Edison 
(2002) showed that the impact on consumption from housing appreciation is 
greater than from the shareholder market. 
The effects on household consumption were felt directly as well as 
indirectly. To the extent that higher housing prices reinforced household assets, 
consumer expenditures increased and the development of savings was reduced, 
following a wealth-effect (Mishkin, 2001; Goodhart & Hofmann, 2007).
Indirect effects, in turn, depended on the fi nancing structure that in the 
United States showed great agility for converting household asset appreciation 
into purchase power by means of credit. Two mechanisms allowed households 
to gain credit based on housing equity: extraction of home equity (also known as 
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cash-out) from the refi nancing of mortgages, and loans of the HEL type (home 
equity lending).
1) Cash-out consists of the extraction of home equity by the refi nancing 
of old mortgages. The reduction of loan rates after 2001 intensifi ed refi nancing 
operations which, to some extent, involved an increase of the principal, with 
reference to the incorporation of portions of appreciation of the house in the new 
contract. Canner et al. (2002) estimates that the absolute value of the extractions 
between 2001 and 2002 had totaled US$ 131.6 billion, of which US$20.7 billion 
could have been used by households to increase their consumption level.
2) As previously stated, home equity loans could be of two types: home 
equity lines of credit or home equity loans, and the release of resources for the fi rst 
type were not dependent on a specifi c end. These types of contracts had grown 
since the middle of the 1990s, especially at the end of the decade and in the 
following years.
Refi nancing volume peaked in June, 2003, closing the year with a record 
value of US$ 2.5 trillion. After that, cash-out was replaced in importance by home 
equity lending as a mechanism for extraction from home equity, highlighted in 
contracts of the home equity lines of credit type. Interest rates on these contracts 
became preferable to other types of debt, just as had the possibility of deducting 
the total paid interest from taxes.18 In turn, the fl exibility in the use of resources 
caused them to be more desirable than home equity loans (Angell, 2004).
Credit institutions also showed interest in increasing the offering of 
resources by means of home equity lines of credit. A predominance of fl exible 
interest rates and the use of properties as guarantee facilitated the management 
of risks. In addition, expansion of borrowers’ debt capacity through property 
appreciation opened up new earning opportunities for lenders. In this sense, 
innovations were introduced in the competition for new recipients of this type 
of credit and in an attempt to raise the level of use of pre-approved credit. 
Some of the principal innovations consisted of contracts whose credit limit was 
automatically increased, according to the appreciation of the properties, or then a 
reduction based on continued payment of interest to the extent that it raised the 
level of use of this credit line; besides the existence of interest-only payments and 
hybrids (fi rst years fi xed interest and after a certain period increasing interest).
Thus, after the favorable impact on purchase power by means of the 
cash-out, concentrated throughout 2001 and in the subsequent months of 
economic recovery, the level of consumption could be also stimulated by other 
means of credit related to housing appreciation, compensating for the decline in 
refi nancing operations.
The impact on housing appreciation from the reduction of interest 
rates also allowed reduction in the weight of the debt load beyond household 
income. By refi nancing mortgages, households began to benefi t from the 
reduction in interest rates. If the fi xed rate mortgages (FRM) provided 
the possibility of refi nancing to reduce the cost of the debt combined with 
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monetary expansion, this effect was more direct in the case of the contracts 
with adjustable rates (ARM).
Housing appreciation also stimulated the level of demand from the rise 
in housing investments. After the verifi ed contraction in the 1980s, from the 
beginning of the following decade the activity of housing construction began 
to heat up again, especially after 1998. In 2005 more than two million new 
residences (US$ 482 billion) were constructed, practically twice the number 
in 1991. 
The behavior of the housing market provided leverage for housing 
investments, whose average participation in the GDP growth rate between 2002 
and 2005 was around 14.8%. This type of investment grew 4.8% and 8.4% in 
2002 and 2003, while many private investments contracted 9.2 % in 2002 and 
presented growth of only 1% the following year (see Table 1).
Table 1 – GDP rates of growth and the components of aggregated demand – 
       2000 to 2008
2008
I II III IV Year
GDP 3.7 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.0 0.9 2.8 -0.5 -6.3 1.1
Family consumption 4.7 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.6 3.0 3.0 2.8 0.9 1.2 -3.8 -4.3 0.2
Private Investment 5.7 -7.9 -2.6 3.6 9.7 5.8 2.1 -5.4 -5.8 -11.5 0.4 -23.0 -6.7
Non-residential 8.7 -4.2 -9.2 1.0 5.8 7.2 7.5 4.9 2.4 2.5 -1.7 -21.7 1.6
Residential 0.8 0.4 4.8 8.4 10.0 6.3 -7.1 -17.9 -25.1 -13.3 -16.0 -22.8 -20.8
Exports 8.7 -5.4 -2.3 1.3 9.7 7.0 9.1 8.4 5.1 12.3 3.0 -23.6 6.2




2.1 3.4 4.4 2.5 1.4 0.4 1.7 2.1 1.9 3.9 5.8 1.3 2.9
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Notes: (1) Data with seasonal adjustment.
(2) The values of four quarters of 2008 refer to the growth rates adjusted by year in relation 
to the previous quarter
Financial Innovations and the “Subprime Crisis”
The role of housing appreciation in stimulating consumption and 
investment in the United States was, however, accompanied by an accumulation 
of risks, infl uenced to a great extent by the increasing complexity of relations 
between debt and credit brought on by fi nancial innovations. 
The growth of involvement with non-traditional contracts and the greater 
possibility of expanding the loan-to-value relation marked the development 
2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
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of the housing fi nance system in the United States after 2001, expanding the 
risks implicit in household mortgage debt.19 Credit institutions anticipated 
that borrowers, in assuming mortgages of these types, that property valuation 
tendencies would be maintained or that the future interest taxes would be 
reduced so that the mortgages could be favorably refi nanced. The spread of these 
subprime and Alt-A segments made the payments further dependent on these 
assumptions.
After 2006, however, the end of the period of low interest rates that 
characterized the fi rst years of the existence of non-traditional mortgage contracts 
had been reached. Thus, the interest rates on these debts, which during their 
fi rst years were around 2%-3% per year, jumped to 10%-15% per year. Combined 
with the rise in the fed funds rate, this movement was refl ected in the increase 
in default levels from these operations. The increase in the number of mortgage 
defaults and the hardening of credit conditions determined the reversal of the 
cycle of prices of housing after the middle of 2006 (see Graphic 1). With the 
depreciation of collateral, the possibility of refi nancing mortgages where the 
borrowers were more vulnerable (subprime and Alt-A) became limited, thereby 
reinforcing the tendency to a high default rate (Guttmann, 2008; Freitas & 
Cintra, 2008).
Source: Offi ce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (Ofheo).
Note: Variation of the Purchase-Only Index with annual adjustment.
Graphic 1 – U.S. Housing Price Index – 1992 to 2008
               (variation in relation to the same quarter of the previous year).
Due to the interconnections created by securitization techniques, the 
crisis in the subprime market (relatively small in spite of the strong growth) of the 
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residential fi nancing system expanded throughout 2007 cascading to the various 
fi nancial markets.
With payment delays of subprime mortgages, the risk classifi cation of 
mortgage-backed securities that joined these credits to the previously mentioned 
suite of mortgages had to be lowered by evaluation agencies. This review 
process by the agencies – which previously had classifi ed these titles as low- risk 
– generated two effects: it obliged pension funds and insurance companies to 
remove these assets from their portfolios, since for regulatory reasons they could 
only carry low-risk assets, and, by generating a lack of confi dence about risk 
evaluations, put into question the price structure of all MBS not issued by the 
GSE (Guttmann, 2008; Kregel, 2008).
The disorder introduced into the MBS market rippled to the markets in 
which these titles served as guarantees. Losses in the subprime markets seemed 
not limited to agents with positions in the riskiest tranches of collateralized debt 
obligations contracts. Thus, the CDO markets also went through a process of 
revising and lowering the risk classifi cation, still further accentuating the climate 
of uncertainty in the fi nancial markets (Dodd, 2007).
The crisis also reached the asset-backed commercial paper market. The 
paralysis of these markets created diffi culties in obtaining short term resources 
by fi nancial agents. The reincorporation of SIV assets onto bank balance 
sheets occurred due to the existence of repurchase agreements in the event of 
depreciation of portfolios or, then, by the growing use of credit lines available to 
them (Eichengreen, 2008).
The decline of assets value of major American and European fi nancial 
institutions, sometimes followed by bankruptcy or the intervention of the Federal 
Reserve and/or national European treasuries, led to credit contraction and the 
strong decline in the world’s principal Stock Markets.
According to the World Federation of Stock Markets, depreciation of 
global stockholder wealth came to around US$ 28.3 trillion in 2008 (-46.5% in 
relation to 2007). Besides this, global fi nancial institutions had already recorded 
more than US$ 800 billion in liabilities. Successive declarations of asset losses by 
the large banks in the United States and Europe deepened the state of uncertainty 
in the interbank markets. At this juncture, the inability to estimate the risks of 
their counterparts brought a halt to these markets, requiring the intervention of 
the central banks of the developed countries.20
The deepening of the fi nancial crisis and the diffi culty of the central 
banks in reestablishing liquidity conditions blocked the established connection 
between appreciation of assets, credit and growth that had come to characterize 
the American economy and, as a consequence, the world’s, as dynamic in recent 
decades. The economic performance data of the United States in the last quarters 
of 2008 has already shown the negative effect of this destruction of wealth on 
aggregated family consumption narrowing, respectively, to 3.8% per year and 
4.3% per year in relation to previous quarters, pulling the national output down 
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with it. Gross investments grew only 0.4% per year in the third quarter and 
plummeted 23% per year in the following quarter. The bad performance of the 
economy in the second half of the year was based on accumulated output growth 
of only 1.1% in 2008, the lowest since 2001 (0.8%) (see Table 1).
In this way, a credit crisis with classic characteristics in the housing 
mortgage sector in the United States, primed by the rise in borrower default level, 
was transformed into a much deeper fi nancial crisis, threatening the functioning 
of different insurance operations on a global level. In the face of a regime of 
fi nance-led growth, depreciation of wealth and contraction of credit yielded 
results creating the conditions for a recessive process the dimensions of which still 
remain uncertain.
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Notes
1  For commentaries and suggestions the author thanks Marcos Antonio M. Cintra, 
exempting – the remaining errors.
2  In contemporary fi nances, fi nancial innovations play an important role in the strategies 
for increase of institutional assets, as well as in generation of its liabilities. Diversifi cation 
of the mechanisms for fund raising highlighted by insurance practices, allowed banks 
and many institutions to defi ne the growth rhythm of their assets so that they could then 
compose the structure of their liabilities (Minsky, 1984).
3  Removal of the ban on branch banking activities occurred in 1994 by means of the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Effi ciency Act, which allowed expansion 
of branches and interstate banks. After 1999, bank holding companies began further 
liberalization of their operations, allowing them to retain insurance and investment 
banks in their corporate structure. The reduction of imposed legal restrictions on 
American fi nancial institutions, especially on banks, made de jure a situation that was 
already de fato, reinforcing tendencies toward fl exibility in the fi nancial system (Freitas, 
1997; Braga & Cintra, 2004).
4  According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of 
Commerce, interest on savings in American families was reduced from an average of 8.7% 
of disposable income between 1970 and 1979 to an average of 4.5% between 1990 and 
1999 and to 2.5% between 2000 and 2005.
5  The system of fi nance-led growth is observable above all in the United States and also in 
Great Britain, as a by-product of their institutional characteristics, as well as the central 
position of the dollar in the international monetary system. Thus this system cannot 
be generalized to the totality of national economies – nor even extended to developed 
nations – even though some aspects that characterize them, from the effect of fi nancial 
deregulation, commercial openings and fl exing of work relations, can be verifi ed in 
various countries. For a synthesis of different approaches on the fi nance-led system, see 
Clévenot (2008).
6  According to National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) data, there were 
120 months of growth, at an average rate of 3.7% between 1992 and 2000. The 
unemployment rate fell by 4%, in 2000, below the conventional minimum rate of 6% at 
the time, referring to nairu (non-accelerating infl ation rate of unemployment)
7  The NASDAQ Index (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
System) went from 373.8 points at the end of 1990 to reach a historic peak of 4,696.7 
points in February 2000. The Dow-Jones Index of the New York Stock Market jumped 
from 2,633 points in December 1990 to 11,215 points in August 2000.
8  See also Galbraith (1988, p.119): “At any given time, there exists an inventory of 
undiscovered embezzlement in, or more precisely not in, the country’s banks and 
businesses. This inventory - perhaps it should be called the bezzle - varies in size with the 
business cycle. In good times, people are relaxed, trusting, and money is plentiful. And 
even though money is plentiful, there are always many people who need more. Under 
these circumstances, the rate of embezzlement grows. The rate of discovery falls off, and 
the bezzle increases sharply. In a depression all this is reversed.”
9  Speculative “bubble” as defi ned in Kindleberger (1992a, p.199): “A bubble may be defi ned 
loosely as a sharp rise in the price of an asset or a range of asset in a continuous process, with 
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the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers – generally 
speculators interested in profi ts from trading in the asset rather than in its use or earning 
capacity. The rise usually followed by a reversal in expectations and a sharp decline in price 
of the resulting in a fi nancial crisis”.
10 From that point on, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises or GSE.
11 The collateral guarantee or collateralized expanded owing to a broad spectrum of 
operations known as asset-backed or loan-backed securities. Between1980 and the third 
quarter of 2006, the assets of federal agencies increased from US$ 309 billion to US$ 
6.7 trillion, accumulating 12.6% of the total asset s of the American fi nancial system. 
During this period, the assets of the Asset-Backed Securities issuers (ABS – securities 
guaranteed by assets) reached US$ 3.3 trillion, a non-existent market in 1980.
12 The major part of mortgage backed securities issued by Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) is bought by large universal banks. A traditional 
residential mortgage implies a capital requirement of 4%, while a standardized mortgage 
issued and/or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac requires only 1.6%, which 
makes it possible to carry more liquid instruments, reducing risks and capital (Basileia 
Agreement, 1988).
13 This contract, commonly known as Neg-Am in the 1980s, came to be known as pay-
option ARM after the end of the 1990s, when its usage intensifi ed.
14 Special purpose vehicles consist of subsidiaries created by fi nancial companies or 
institutions, above all the major banks that try, thereby, to reduce the volume of capital 
required by prudent regulation. The SIV acquires assets that their controllers do not wish 
to retain on the balance sheet, fi nancing purchase by means of issuing titles or short term 
bank debt. Eichengreen (2008) emphasizes that these SIV can be similar to hedge funds, 
assuming high degrees of leverage and mis-matched terms.
15 For greater detail about the CDO market, see IMF (2006, 2007).
16 According to Ofheo, the regions that had the greatest residential appreciation were: New 
England, Pacifi c and the Middle Atlantic.
17 According to Poterba (2001), in 1998 only 10.4% of families with annual income less 
than US$ 25 thousand owned stocks. Among the rich, with income greater than US$ 
250 thousand per year, nearly 84.5% owned stocks. According to Henwood (1997), 
among families that owned stocks directly (in other words, excluding ownership of stocks 
through funds), the richest 5% had 94.5% of the stocks in 1992.
18 Housing appreciation could also stimulate mortgage refi nancing even without changing 
the loan interest rate as in the home equity extraction. However, the costs with payment 
of taxes and fi nes owing to pre-payment make home equity lending type credit contracts 
more advantageous.
19 According to Zelman et al. (2007), participation in mortgages of the Interest Only and 
Neg-Am types in the total of mortgages issued in 2006 was from 23%, a growth of 22 
p.p. in relation to 2001.
20 About the interventions of the Federal Reserve and central banks of other developed 
countries, see Freitas & Cintra (2008) e Guttmann (2008).
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ABSTRACT – Since the 1980’s and after, American fi nances had passed through deep 
changes that reinforced the role of capital markets in wealth and credit management in 
the U. S. In this new fi nance structure decision concerning household and corporation 
expenses suffered from important infl uences on theirs assets from price cycles, resulting 
in fi nance-led economic cycles. The article assesses the last two economic cycles in the 
United States, during which period the value of residential property replaced the role 
previously fulfi lled by the shareholder value to stimulate the aggregate expenditure and 
investment.
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